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This study provides empirical data about shipboard practices in bridge operations on
board a selection of platform supply vessels (PSVs). Using the theoretical concept of
distributed situation awareness, the study examines how situation awareness (SA)-
related information is distributed and coordinated at the bridge. This study thus favours a
systems approach to studying SA, viewing it not as a phenomenon that solely happens in
each individual’s mind but rather as something that happens between individuals and the
tools that they use in a collaborative system. Thus, this study adds to our understanding of
SA as a distributed phenomenon. Data were collected in four field studies that lasted
between 8 and 14 days on PSVs that operate on the Norwegian continental shelf and UK
continental shelf. The study revealed pronounced variations in shipboard practices
regarding how the bridge team attended to operational planning, communication
procedures, and distracting/interrupting factors during operations. These findings shed
new light on how SA might decrease in bridge teams during platform supply operations.
The findings from this study emphasize the need to assess and establish shipboard
practices that support the bridge teams’ SA needs in day-to-day operations.
Practitioner points
 Provides insights into how shipboard practices that are relevant to planning, communication and the
occurrence of distracting/interrupting factors are realized in bridge operations.
 Notes possible areas for improvement to enhance distributed SA in bridge operations.
The oil and gas industry is dependent on services from the maritime industry for rig-
moving operations, platform supply operations, and standby services, among other
functions. Because of the potential for severe damage to human, environmental, and
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economic assets, collisions between attendant vessels1 and offshore facilities are among
theworst-case scenarios in the industry.On8 June 2009, such an event occurredwhen the
well-stimulation vesselBigOrangeXVIII lost control and collidedwith an offshore facility
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf at a speed of approximately 9.7 knots. Although the
consequences were limited to financial losses, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority
considers this incident to have had a large hazard potential (Kvitrud, 2011). In general,
collisions between attendant vessels and offshore facilities involve the risk of damage to
substructure and hydrocarbon pipelines, with subsequent leakage and possible ignition
and fire.2 According to the investigators in the Big Orange XVIII case, the direct cause of
the collision was the duty officer’s assumption that the vessel was on manual steering
when it was, in fact, on autopilot (Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority, 2009). As a
result, all attempts to steer the vessel manually failed, and the ensuing collision with the
offshore facility was unavoidable.
From 2001 to 2010, 26 collisions between attendant vessels and offshore facilities
on the Norwegian continental shelf were reported, and at least six are believed to have
had catastrophic potential (Kvitrud, 2011). These six cases were analysed in two earlier
studies that sought to identify common contributing factors. Oltedal (2012) found that
human errors in detecting or interpreting a technical state or error were the direct
cause in four of the six cases. These findings are in agreement with the conclusions of
Kvitrud (2011), who identified poor understanding of and training in advanced
technical equipment as important underlying factors. A recent study of 23 available
accident reports from 2001 to 2011 concerning collisions between attendant vessels
and offshore installations on the Norwegian continental shelf suggests that 18 of 23
collisions were caused, at least in part, by the bridge teams’ loss of situation awareness
(SA) (Sandhaland, Oltedal, & Eid, 2015). SA was then defined as ‘awareness of what is
happening around you and understanding what that information means to you now
and in the future’ (Endsley, 2012, p. 13). Another notable finding of the Sandhaland
et al.’s (2015) study was that planning failure was an antecedent to loss of SA in 10 of
these 18 cases. A typical example of planning failure was inadequate use of available
checklists prior to the operation, which in turn caused a lack of awareness regarding
the vessels’ technical status. The study also identified communication failure as an
antecedent to loss of SA in seven of the 18 cases. An example of a communication
failure is the inadequate transfer of command at the bridge or the failure to transfer
critical information during shift handover. Finally, distracting/interrupting elements
were identified as antecedents to loss of SA in six of the 18 cases, for example the need
to perform administrative tasks that drew attention away from the navigational
equipment or surrounding environment.
The bridge on a ship represents a complex collaborative system in which highly
specialized individuals operate navigational equipment and interact to perform safety-
critical operations. Following from a systems ergonomics perspective, the bridge is a
prototypical example of a system in which performance is closely dependant on
interaction with and efficient use of tools, such as steering documents, checklists, and
1 This term refers to vessels that provide services to offshore installations, such as platform supply vessels (PSVs), anchor-handling
vessels, standby vessels, and oil tankers. Historical data indicate that 98% of collisions between vessels and offshore facilities on
the Norwegian continental shelf involve attendant vessels (The North West European Area Guidelines, 2009).
2 SeeDaley (2013) for a description of theMumbaiHighNorth accident, in which amultipurpose supply vessel lost control and hit
several marine risers on an offshore facility on the west coast of India. The collision caused a gas leak, which ignited and caused 22
fatalities.
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technology. According to Stanton, Salmon, Walker, and Jenkins (2010), distributed
situation awareness (DSA) is a salient characteristic of complex collaborative systems that
can be defined as ‘activated knowledge for a specific taskwithin a system at a specific time
by specific agents’ (p. 34). Following from this perspective, it is important to examine
interactions between agents (human and non-human actors), including interactions
between individuals and interactions between individuals and tools, to describe how SA
information is distributed and coordinatedwithin the system (Salmon, Stanton,Walker, &
Jenkins, 2009). In this study,wedrawon the concept ofDSA and extend thefindings of the
Sandhaland et al. (2015) study, which indicated that inadequate planning, communica-
tion failure, and interrupting/distracting elements are important antecedents to loss of SA.
In particular, we wanted to increase our understanding of how interactions between
agents in bridge operations on board a selection of PSVs are reflected in established
practices related to planning, communication, and management of distracting/interrupt-
ing elements, and in turn, how shipboard practices affect the bridge teams’ SA needs.
Previous research has relied heavily on accident analysis to understand the complex
individual and contextual factors that increase the likelihood of accidents in the maritime
industry; however, accident analysis might overemphasize the unique and salient aspects
of the situation because of distortion, self-serving bias, and decay of information over time
(Macrae, 2009). In this study, we chose an ethnographic, true-to-life approach, sampling
and assessing everyday situations on board a selection of PSVs.
Because a significant proportion of the work on board a PSV happens near offshore
facilities, there is a risk of collisionswith these facilities. For that reason, we put particular
emphasis on shipboard practices related to safe approach and positioning of the vessels
alongside the offshore facilities. We were especially interested in observing the planning
and execution of operations alongside offshore facilities, the communication between
bridge team members, and potentially distracting/interrupting elements that could have
implications for the bridge teams’ SA.
Moreover, although the bridge teams’ SA could be influenced by factors independent
of the bridge (e.g., if the team made decisions during coffee breaks or off-duty periods),
our study was limited to practices at the bridge.
Theoretical foundation
Theories of SA
The concept of SA has been debated, and different approaches to studying SA have been
suggested. From a psychological perspective, SA is understood as cognitive processes in
the minds of individuals in a system. From a systems ergonomics perspective, SA is
understood as a process that happens through interactions between individuals and the
tools that they use to accomplish their goals (Stanton et al., 2010). These two approaches
to studying SA are further detailed below.
Within the psychological tradition, the most cited model of SA is Endsley’s (1995)
three-level model. She suggested that an individual builds SA at three different levels. First
(SA level 1), the operator perceives critical information that is relevant to his or her goals.
In the context of safe navigation, this information may include factors such as the vessel’s
operational status, the vessel’s positioning, and other approaching vessels. Second (SA
level 2), the operator will integrate and evaluate the information at hand. She or he has to
understand the perceived information in relation to relevant goals and objectives, such as
safe approach to an offshore facility. Third (SA level 3), the operator uses his or her
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perception and comprehension of the situation to forecast and estimate likely imminent
outcomes, opportunities, or threats. For instance, by calculating speed, currents, and
wind, the duty officer can avoid colliding with the offshore facility by taking manual
control or reprogramming the automatic navigation systems.
Following from Endsley’s three-level model, studies of SA involve examining the
cognitive processes in each individuals mind. In contrast, the concept of DSA favours a
system ergonomic approach to studying SA by considering the physical or social
environment in which these cognitive processes occur. In accordance with the
concept of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), a central assumption in DSA is that
SA information is held by different agents that comprise a collaborative system. An
intriguing implication of conceptualizing SA as distributed cognition is that SA
information is not only distributed within the team but also in the tools that they use to
accomplish their goals (Salmon et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2006). At the bridge on
board a PSV, several tools provide the bridge team members with SA information
including radar equipment, anemometers, wave riders, current and tide tables, weather
forecasts, and steering documents. Following from this conceptualization, Stanton
et al. (2006) proposed that DSA is a product of coordination among these agents such
that the system itself holds the SA that is required to accomplish its goals. It is thus
critical that the right information is transferred to the right team member at the right
time in order for each individual to achieve and maintain the SA necessary for their
function in the system (Stanton et al., 2010). Thus, in contrast to the psychological
approach to SA, a DSA approach views SA as a system property ‘by consideration of the
information held by the artefacts and people and the way in which they interact’
(Stanton et al., 2010, p. 34).
In maritime bridge operations, safe navigation and execution of cargo operations are
the result of a team effort rather than the work of an isolated individual. From a
psychological perspective, the concept of team SA, which is defined as ‘the degree to
which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibility’
(Endsley, 1999, p. 270), recognizes the different SA needs and requirements that are
associated with different roles in a team. However, according to Endsley (2012), the
degree of SA shared among the members in the team should be high. Although it may be
intuitively appealing, the concept of shared SA is problematic because unique personal
preferences, schemata, skills, and training influence each team member’s perception of
the situation. In response to these inherent difficulties, proponents of a DSA perspective
have suggested that different team members have different roles and therefore need to
comprehend and use information differently (Stanton et al., 2010). It is further
emphasized that the agents that comprise a collaborative system may have different but
potentially compatible SA, depending on the role of each agent in the system (Stanton
et al., 2006).
A DSA approach to examining SA in collaborative systems does not imply that
psychological approaches to studying SA are redundant; rather, DSA approaches provide
an alternative and complementary view of SA in collaborative systems (Salmon et al.,
2008). We have adopted a DSA approach because this perspective captures more of the
human–system interaction in complex operational systems such as PSVs. We also believe
that this approachwill enhance our understanding of the factors that influence the bridge
teammembers’ SA.TheDSAperspectivewill furtherpoint to thepotential valueofusingan
ethnographic, process-oriented approach to investigate SA in complex collaborative
systems.
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Antecedents to SA
Previous research has identified factors that are believed to affect SA in operational
settings. For instance, Sneddon, Mearns, and Flin (2013) found that stress, sleep
disruption, and fatiguewere associated with lower levels of work SA in a study of offshore
drill crews. Endsley (2001, 2012) proposed that both system design (availability of
information) and interface design (how information is presented) are important in SA.
Factors such as training, knowledge, and skills are also important in regard to the bridge
team’s achievement and maintenance of SA in operational settings (Endsley, 1995;
Espevik, Johnsen, & Eid, 2011). Planning activities, communication, and distracting/
interrupting elements have also been suggested to influence SA. In the following sections,
we will elaborate on these themes.
Planning. High-quality planning prior to performance of a task can reduce the risk of
loss of SA because it can increase bridge teams’ awareness of the risks that are associated
with an upcoming task (Flin, O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008). If critical information
provided by other agents is missed ormisperceived, this miscommunication could lead to
loss of SA and severe consequences. It is therefore particularly important that the bridge
team pay close attention to planning. In particular, contingency planning – anticipating
possible scenarios and threats –may contribute to consolidating and developing schemata
and structural aspects of social tasks. Insofar as planning provides shared knowledge
about the system, possible threats, and strategies, it may increase the likelihood of the
bridge team achieving an SA that will facilitate individual and collective task performance
(Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010).
Communication. In our observations of bridge teams at work, our point of departure
was that interactions such as information sharing and interaction with technological
equipment or the environment are vital for optimal systemperformance (Bolstad, Cuevas,
Gonzalez, & Schenider, 2005). A notable aspect of this dependence is that communication
failure is often reported to precede loss of SA because communication is commonly
considered to be a key factor in connecting and maintaining the different parts of a
distributed system (Stanton et al., 2010). In analysing team communication, it might be
helpful to distinguish between information exchange and communication to under-
stand how practices can affect bridge teams’ information needs. Thus, information
exchange refers to the type of information that is transferred between the bridge team
members. The transmission of critical information, such as the location of nearby vessels
and the transfer of command during shift handover, is relevant for safe navigation. In
contrast, communication refers to how the information is transferred between the bridge
team members. Communication should involve the use of succinct and accurate
terminology without circuitous language (Smith-Jentsch, Johnston, & Payne, 1998). In
addition, it is critical to ensure that the information is understood. To this end, closed-loop
communication, inwhich the receiver repeats the information and the sender confirms it,
may be an effective technique (Bowers, Jentsch, Salas, & Braun, 1998).
Distracting/interrupting elements. Direct attention is necessary to perceive and
understand received information (Endsley, 1995). Thus, the bridge teammembers’ ability
to sustain attention is a critical dimension. In operational settings, the flow of information
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between agents can be complex and dynamic, which makes operators vulnerable to
distractions and interruptions (Endsley & Robertson, 2000; Flin et al., 2008; Robertson &
Endsley, 1995). Distracting and interrupting elements can stem from various sources,
such as incoming telephone calls or other crewmembers, and they increase the strain on
limited attention resources (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).
System description
In addition to national regulations, international conventions, and shipping companies’
safety systems, the North West European Area (NWEA) guidelines for the safe
management of offshore supply and anchor-handling operations3 provide structured
recommendations to assist bridge teams in their day-to-day operations. The NWEA
guidelineswere developed as a joint project betweenmaritime and offshore organizations
in Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, and Norway to incorporate best practices in
offshore supply and anchor-handling operations in the industry (The North West
European Area Guidelines, 2009). Although the guidelines have the status of recommen-
dations, vessels that provide supply services to the offshore industry must comply with
the guidelines according to client requirements. The NWEA guidelines note possible
dangers, encourage vigilance, and prescribe a systematic, data-driven approach to safe
navigation. In effect, the guidelines shape the bridge teams’ assessment and comprehen-
sion of situations and prescribe best practices. Therefore, theNWEA guidelines constitute
a common framework for establishing SA during offshore operations.
The bridge team on board a PSV usually consists of four officers divided into two shifts.
The chief officer and themaster are usually on separate shifts and are pairedwith an officer
of lower rank. In addition, cadets are occasionally added to the bridge team for training
purposes. The offshore facilities are protected by a safety zonewith a radius of 500metres,
and access to the offshore facilities requires permission from the offshore facility’s control
room. Whenever the vessels operate inside the safety zones, the NWEA guidelines
mandate that the bridge be manned with two officers or, alternatively, one officer and a
cadet with a bridge-watch certificate; however, sailing between port and the offshore
facilities is frequently performed with a single officer present on the bridge. Before the
vessels are given permission to enter the offshore facilities’ safety zones, the bridge teams
must confirm that mandatory checklists have been completed. These checklists concern
the vessel’s technical status, assessment of weather conditions and communication lines,
and other items. According to the NWEA guidelines, loading/offloading operations
alongside the offshore facilities should, to the greatest extent possible, be performed on
the leeward side to ensure that if a vessel experiences any technical problems, it will be in
a drift-off position and thus avoid colliding with the offshore facility.
The bridge team on board a PSV employs a variety of tools to navigate safely, but the
vessels included in our study had different bridge arrangements regarding the placement
of tools and the interior of the bridge. Figure 1 depicts a typical bridge.
Loading/offloading operations alongside the offshore facilities are performed from the
stern steering position and usually through dynamic positioning (DP). DP is an advanced
automated manoeuvring system that is based on positioning reference systems such as
global positioning systems. The DP system requires minimal intervention by the bridge
3 TheNWEA guidelines were replaced by Guidelines for Offshore andMarine Operations (GOMO) on 1 June 2014. However, the
NWEA guidelines remained in effect at the time this study was conducted.
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team to keep the vessel in a fixed position; the main task for the bridge team is to monitor
the technical system and surrounding environment and take action as needed. During
loading/offloading operations, both officers were positioned at the stern steering
position. The normal division of responsibility is that the DP operator is responsible for
navigational activities, whereas the other officer is responsible for the loading/offloading
operation, communication with other actors, and supporting the DP operators that are
engaged in monitoring. Sailing back and forth between port and offshore facilities, in
addition to between offshore facilities, was usually performed using autopilot from the
forward steering position. All of the vessels used the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System as an alternative to paper nautical charts. In addition to electronic
chart information, the system integrates information that is provided by an automatic
identification system, such as other vessels’ positions, heading, and speed, and generates
alarms when the vessel faces a risk, such as a collision with another vessel. The vessels
were also equipped with radar systems that use radio waves to detect objects in the
fairway. In addition, available control panels provided various indicators related to the
vessels’ technical systems, such as engine-control indicators.
Method
A theory-driven ethnographic approach
A critical challenge in ethnographic studies is the choice of a focus because the researcher
simply cannot observe everything. A theoretical proposal is needed to guide data
collection (Willis & Trondman, 2002; Yin, 2009). In this respect, this study builds on
concepts at several levels of abstraction. First, the concept of DSA allows us to examine
practices to describe how SA information is distributed and coordinated on the bridge.
Figure 1. Sketch of a typical bridge on board a platform supply vessels (PSV).
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Second, the selected themes (i.e., planning, communication, and management of
distracting/interrupting elements) connect toDSA in that they refer to interactions among
agents that comprise the system. These activities are also believed to influence the bridge
team’s ability to achieve and maintain SA. Finally, this study required more accurate
concepts within each theme, which we termed ‘observable practices’ (e.g., planning of
the approach to the offshore facility, communication related to the transfer of command,
and conduction of administrative tasks during navigational activities), to focus on
situations that are relevant to the PSV setting. In this process, we drew on findings from
previous studies of collisions between attendant vessels and offshore facilities (Kvitrud,
2011; Oltedal, 2012; Sandhaland et al., 2015), along with information derived from a
preparatory field trip on board a PSV and informal conversations with navigators.
Concepts were selected based on previous research and the informed opinions of
practitioners regarding critical components of safe navigation on board a PSV. Together,
these concepts served as a framework that gave the study direction.
Sample descriptions
The fieldwork was conducted on board four PSVs that belong to two Norwegian-
controlled shipping companies. Both shipping companies were selected based on their
extensive experience in providing supply services to the oil and gas industry. PSVs were
chosen because they are the type of vessel that most frequently approaches offshore
facilities. The vessels included in the study were state-of-the-art PSVs built between 2003
and 2012.With some variations, a typical vessel was 90 m long and 20 mwide and carried
5000 tonnes of deadweight tonnage. The crew members had private cabins and shared
off-duty recreational facilities, such as fitness equipment, television, and internet facilities.
The rotation arrangementwas 4 weeks atwork and 4 weeks off on all of the vessels. All of
the vesselswere on long-term charters to three different oil companies. Two of the vessels
operated on the Norwegian continental shelf, and the remaining two operated on the UK
continental shelf. Apart from some vessel-specific adjustments to the checklists, both
shipping companies had to follow the NWEA operational guidelines. All four vessels
aimed to supply the offshore facilities in an efficient and safe manner.
A total of 18 bridge teammembers (15 officers and three cadets) from eight shifts were
included in this study. All participants spoke Norwegian fluently and, except for one
participant, all had trained at Norwegian educational institutions.
Data collection
Each fieldwork period lasted for between 8 and 14 days, with an average attendance on
the bridge of approximately 10 hr a day. Approximately 450 hr of observational datawere
collected for the study. The fieldwork was conducted over a 1-year period from October
2012 to October 2013.
To minimize disturbance to the operations performed at the bridge, only one
researcher worked on board the vessels. The researcher who conducted the field work
has a theoretical background in risk and safety management and has also worked with
safety issues in the oil and gas industry.
Several studies have highlighted the importance of trust and cooperation for the
collectionof accurate anddependabledata infieldwork (Aase&Fossaskaret, 2007;DeWalt
& DeWalt, 2011; Fangen, 2005). In this respect, a role that was consistent with Gold’s
(1958) ‘participant-as-observer’ was adopted. That is, the researcher followed the crew in
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their day-to-day activities and spentmore time participating and interactingwith the crew
members than observing fromadistance. In practice, this involved informal conversations
and asking questions when the crewmembers were available. In addition, the researcher
observedhowthebridge teammembers interactedwith eachother andwithother entities
to gain first-hand experience of naturally occurring events and some familiarity with the
underlying operational procedures. The bridge teams also demonstrated how the
equipment on the bridge (e.g., the DP system and position reference systems) worked,
thereby providing the opportunity to further elaborate on technical information that
emerged during conversations and observations. The researcher also asked questions
related to observations. For instance, when the bridge team positioned the vessel
alongside the offshore facility without any prior overt discussion, the researcher might
have asked ‘What type of assessment did youdowhen youmade this particular approach?’
Some theorists have suggested that writing field notes in view of the informants might
strain relationships with the researcher and distract the researcher in the field (Emerson,
Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Fangen, 2005). Field notes were therefore written in between the
observation periods. The researcher withdrew to the cabin several times a day or
immediately after significant events to record observations. Observations and quotations
presented in this study are excerpts from the researcher’s field notes. Thus, the reader
should be aware that observations and quotations are as remembered by the researcher.
Processing and presentation of results
Initially, observations and quotations were systematized according to the concepts in the
framework. We thereby used a ‘provisional coding’ method, in which codes were
generated from investigations performed prior to the fieldwork (Salda~na, 2009).
Thereafter, the data were re-examined, and the initial categories were refined. Finally,
the data were re-examined to identify similarities and differences between vessels. The
coding of the field notes was performed by the first author, who also performed the field
work. The findings were discussed with experts in navigation and safety sciences
throughout the coding process.
The representational style of this study might, according to Van Maanen’s (2011)
classification of voices of the field, be characterized as a ‘realist tale’. We present our
findings as concrete images of shipboard practices on the bridge that are related to
planning, communication, and management of distracting/interacting elements. The
researcher’s experience in the field is not highlighted; rather, the story that we tell
conveys concrete descriptions of what the bridge teams do and say and is organized
according to our selected themes and observable practices.
Each vessel and informant was assigned a code to identify their observations and
quotations. The vessels are coded V1, V2, V3, and V4; officers are given the codes O1, O2,
O3, and O4; and cadets are given the codes C1 and C2, which are in turn linked to their
vessel (e.g., V1-O3 and V3-C1). Occasionally, it was necessary to refer to a particular shift;
shifts are coded as S1 or S2 and similarly linked to the vessel (e.g., V1-S1).
Methodological challenges
We hope that the above chapter convinces the reader that ethnography is a useful
methodological approach in this context; however, all methodological approaches have
limitations. In this section, we will concentrate on the major limitations that we believe
influenced our findings. First, the relationship between the researcher and the bridge
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team may have influenced the findings in several ways. Structurally, the researcher
inhabited an ‘unknown’ position in that all bridge team members had clear rights and
duties in relation to each other, but the researcher was an outsider with no clear rights
and duties in relation to the vessel. This position may have caused some uncertainty both
about the researcher’s role on board the vessel and the aims of the study. Additionally,
the researcher’s presence may have influenced the bridge team’s behaviour. Statements
such as ‘I have to say, you do the checklists thoroughly when she [the researcher] is
present’ (V4-O3) suggest that the researcher’s presence promoted increased use of
checklists and other steering documentation. Second, the researcher’s lack of a nautical
background is important in terms of the researcher’s understanding of the system. In a
high-tech expert-run system, such as a PSV, outsiders are unlikely be able to fully
understand the ongoing processes. The use of highly specialized terminology and tacit
agreements among the bridge team members may also have impeded the researcher’s
understanding.
Results
In the following sections, we describe how shipboard practices related to planning,
communication, and management of distracting elements were realized in day-to-day
operations. Regarding planning activities, we focus on planning of the approach to the
offshore facility and contingency planning related to operations alongside the offshore
facility. In regard to communication practices, we focus on communication between
bridge team members during completion of checklists, transfer of command, DP
operations, and changes in the vessel’s manoeuvring position. Finally, distracting and
interrupting elements are examined in terms of interferencewith administrative tasks, use
of electronic devices, and non-essential conversations.
Planning practices
The NWEA guidelines underscore the importance of the planning phase before vessels
enteranoffshore facility’s safetyzone(TheNorthWestEuropeanAreaGuidelines,2009). In
this phase of the voyage, thebridge teamuses a variety of informationprovidedby assorted
agents tomake a safe approach and position the vessel alongside the offshore facility. This
information includes, but is not limited to, information about environmental forces
provided by tools (e.g., anemometers, wave riders, current and tide tables, and weather
forecasts), information provided by the offshore facility regarding operational conditions
onboardtheoffshore facility (e.g.,positioningandrangeofcranes,potentialanchorchains,
heading, and flaring), and information provided by the technical equipment on board the
vessel regarding the vessel’s technical status and loadingplans regarding thepositioningof
cargo on deck. The following sections present observations and quotations to illustrate
findings that relate to pre-entry safety planning, including contingency planning.
Planning of approach
On one of the vessels (V2), the senior officer on both shifts initiated active discussions
about how to approach and position the vessel alongside the offshore facilities. The
following narrative describes a conversation between a senior officer and his junior officer
prior to approaching the offshore facility and positioning the vessel:
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A senior officer and his junior officer have different suggestions about how to approach and
position the vessel alongside the offshore facility. The senior officer asks the junior officer to
state the arguments for his viewpoint. Subsequently, the senior officer suggests a different
solution and adds that they have always performed it like that. The junior officer then replies ‘I
don’t care if you have performed it like that for the last 100 years, there may be better
solutions’, towhich the senior officer replies ‘You’re right. Let’s do it yourway.’ After awhile,
once the vessel is well positioned alongside the facility, the senior officer comments, ‘It was a
good idea to position it like this.’ (V2-O1 and V2-O3)
In the situation outlined above, different solutions for how to approach and position the
vessel are proposed. On the remaining three vessels (V1, V3, V4), planning practices
varied; however, planning for the approach and positioning very often took the form of a
brief exchange and tacit agreement among the bridge team members, as follows: Officer
V3-O1: ‘Which side do they [the offshore facility] prefer?’ and Officer V3-O3: ‘The east
side.’ Little additional verbal communication occurred among the bridge team members,
thereby implying that these assessments and the subsequent decision regarding the
situation occurred in each individual’s mind, without explicit communication about
procedures. The differences in planning practices among the vessels seem to be
associated with shipboard leadership and the associated training philosophy. The senior
officers on board the vessel that held overt discussions frequently encouraged the junior
officers and cadets to express their viewpoints, as supported by an observation in which
one senior officer listened to the discussion between a junior officer and his cadet
regarding how to approach and position the vessel. The senior officer did not interfere in
the discussion before they finished; afterwards, he asked them to state the arguments in
support of their decision. Based on the ensuing discussion, the initial plan was adjusted
(V2-O2, V2-O4, and V2-C1).
Contingency planning
Although all known risk factors were considered and the vessel was well positioned,
unforeseen events such as technical failures remain possible. Several of our informants
expressed concerns about this possibility:
As a DP operator, I constantly think about what might go wrong and what to do if anything
should happen (. . .) we often talk about how important it is to think through what might
happen and how to address the situation if the worst-case scenarios should ever materialise.
(V1-O1)
No explicit discussions of such scenarios were witnessed, thus indicating that
contingency planning was primarily performed as an individual activity rather than as
a team activity on board the vessels; however, one of the participants had a different
opinion:
It is not possible to keep in mind what could go wrong at all times—then it is impossible to
work. If, for example, we have positioned the vessel on theweather side, wind limitations are
within requirements and you have enough engine power, then you just have to rely on your
equipment—living is dangerous as well. If we are positioned on the downwind side, then
there is nothing to worry about anyhow. (V3-O2)
This quotation indicates that there are other views regarding the value of contingency
planning.
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Communication practices
Operations on board a PSV require interaction among various agents, both on board the
vessel and on the offshore facility. For the bridge team to gain access to safety-critical
information, it is important that the information is communicated in a clear and
unambiguous manner. The overall picture shows great variation in communication
practices on board the vessels. In the following section, we provide examples of
communication related to the completion of checklists, transfer of command, and DP
operations alongside offshore facilities, including switching between the vessel’s
manoeuvring positions.
Completion of checklists
The bridge teams have mandatory checklists that are available during the planning of
an approach that can support their awareness of critical information before the
vessel enters the safety zone. The pre-entry checklist has checkpoints for the
vessel’s operational status, communication lines with the offshore facility and other
departments on board, and weather conditions, among other items. If the vessel is
preparing for DP operations, an additional checklist that pertains to the operational
status of the DP and its backup systems must also be completed. However,
communication among the bridge team members during the completion of
checklists varied considerably between vessels. On one vessel (V1), Officer A cited
the items in the checklists, whereas both Officer A and Officer B checked the
system independently and reported on the items. On another vessel (V2), Officer A
cited items in the checklist, whereas Officer B checked the system and reported
back to Officer A. On the two remaining vessels (V3 and V4), the method for
completion of the checklists depended on the officer on duty. The general rule on
these vessels was that the checklists were performed by a single officer, either
without any communication with the other officer or with two-way communication
about some of the items. The following is an example of the latter:
The vessel is heading towards the offshore facility’s safety zone, and the cadet is completing
the 500-metre pre-entry checklist. He is reading some of the items aloud, and the officers reply
with a yes or no.When he reads the item ‘autopilot off’, the two other officers both reply ‘not
yet.’ The cadet continues with the rest of the items. Meanwhile, there is a shift handover and,
as part of the handover, the cadet informs the oncoming shift that ‘the 500-metre checklist is
completed, everything OK’. (V3-S1)
No further information regarding the status of the autopilot was exchanged. In addition to
providing an example of how the checklists were completed on board the vessel, this
situation also demonstrates that the checklist was started and completed by the bridge
team that was going off shift rather than the shift responsible for the approach and
positioning alongside the offshore facility.
Some participants, especially the less experienced officers, stated that they regarded
the checklists as useful tools, whereas others emphasized that they would complete the
listed tasks with or without the checklists. Checklist activities were occasionally
completed bymemory, independent of the paper copy andwithout communicationwith
other bridge team members.
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Transfer of command
Everyone must have a clear understanding of which officer is in command of the vessel at
any given moment. To this end, transfers of command must be made explicitly. Such
transfers occur both between shifts and during the shift. During shift handovers, the
transfer of command was, as far as it was observed on all the vessels, performed using the
statements ‘good watch’ and ‘good watch below’. This was performed after necessary
operational and safety-critical information had been given to the oncoming shift;
however, explicit communication is important when command is transferred between
and within shifts. For instance, on two of the vessels (V1 and V2), both the chief officers
and the masters frequently approached the bridge even when they were off duty.
Although there seemed to be a common understanding regarding who was in command,
their interactions with the duty officer on watch appeared to create situations with a
potential for confusion. The following passage describes a situation on board one of the
vessels:
The vessel is on autopilot heading towards port. The officer on watch leaves the control
stand in order to make coffee and perform some minor routine tasks. The master of the
vessel, who has already entered the bridge, positions himself by the control stand. No
explicit information exchange about the command of the vessel or about the vessel’s
operational status occurs. When the officer on watch finishes his duties, he joins the
master at the control stand, where they both remain for a while—until the master
leaves the bridge. (V1-O1 and V1-O4)
In the situation outlined above, command issues seem to be based on tacit agreement
rather than a clear and unambiguous transfer of command. In addition, no information
regarding the voyage was exchanged before the officer on watch left the control stand.
DP operations and changes in the vessel’s manoeuvring position
During DP operations alongside the offshore facilities, misperceptions and misun-
derstandings may have serious consequences. In such operations, the responsibilities
of the officers are normally predefined such that one is responsible for the DP
operation, whereas the other is responsible for loading/offloading, communication
with other parties, and support for the DP operator’s monitoring responsibilities.
Because the vessels are equipped with two DP stations, both officers have access to
navigational equipment and communication devices. On most of the observed shifts
(V1-S1, V2-S1, V2-S2, V3-S1, V4-S2), the predefined division of responsibility seemed
to be followed; however, on three shifts (V1-S2, V3-S2, V4-S1), frequent deviations
from the predefined division of responsibility were observed. Observations from two
of the shifts (V1-S2 and V4-S1) are relevant to communication because they indicate
that the officer responsible for loading/offloading sporadically acknowledged pre-
warnings on the DP system that indicated that the vessel’s location deviated from
the DP set point. Such warnings are indicated not by an audible alarm but rather by
text and a colour code on the DP screen. In these cases, the pre-warnings were
acknowledged without communication of the action to the DP operator.
When vessels operate on DP, their steering mode is transferred from the forward
manoeuvring station to the DP station that is positioned aft. Thus, changes in the vessel’s
manoeuvring position can represent a risk (The North West European Area Guidelines,
2009). Until the transfer and takeover of command are acknowledged from the other
steering position, the bridge team is not in control of the vessel’s movements. On two of
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the vessels (V3 andV4), this operationwas primarily performedby a single officer, thereby
making communication irrelevant. On the remaining two vessels (V1 andV2), the transfer
of the manoeuvring position was performed by two officers – One at the forward
manoeuvring station and the other at the aft manoeuvring station. On these vessels, the
transfers were, as a general rule, performed using a standardized communication
procedure: ‘All controls set to neutral position—are you ready?’ and ‘All controls set to
neutral position—I am ready.’ With only minor changes in the wording, this communi-
cationwas consistent on one of the vessels (V2). On the other vessel (V1), the bridge team
occasionally deviated from this standardized communication. The following passage
describes one of those situations:
The vessel has completed its loading/offloading operation and is about to exit the offshore
facility 500-metre safety zone. The following describes the communication during transfer of
manoeuvring control: Officer A, who is positioned aft, asks: ‘Do you want her?’ whereupon
Officer B at the forward position answers: ‘Yes.’ A few seconds after transfer of control,
Officer A mumbles, ‘There is something wrong here’, and at the same time, Officer B shouts,
‘Deactivate the thrusters!’ Officer A then replies, ‘I cannot do it.’ Subsequently, Officer B joins
Officer A at the aft position and, within a few seconds, they have sorted out the problem.
(V1-O1 and V1-O2)
It turned out that their problems were caused by the controls, which were not set in the
neutral position; this, in turn, caused unexpected movements. It is reasonable to assume
that the use of standardized communication would have created greater awareness
regarding the status of the technical system.
Interruptions and distractions
Most professionals manage interruptions and distractions on a daily basis, and bridge
teams on board PSVs are no exception. In addition to navigation, the bridge teams have to
manage radio communication and incoming telephone calls, among other things.
Although interruptions and distractions are an essential part of bridge operations, their
potential negative consequences for safe navigation should not be ignored.We focused on
interrupting and distracting elements that originate from ‘non-task-related’ factors, that is
factors that were not related to an ongoing operation. The most prominent factors were
related to concurrent taskmanagement, such as administrative tasks, the use of electronic
devices, and informal, non-essential conversations. We will elaborate on these findings in
the following sections.
Administrative tasks
Some participants stated that the number of administrative tasks did not influence their
ability to attend to navigational activities because there was a sensible allocation of tasks
among the bridge team members; this claim was also supported by observations.
However, other participants indicated that the number of administrative tasks on board
the vessel challenged their ability to fulfil their navigational responsibilities. The following
passage describes one of those situations:
One of the officers is alone on the bridge, and the vessel is on autopilot heading towards port.
Located in the administrative area of the bridge, the officer is busy updating maritime
documents. In that position, he had a limited view of both the control stand and the
286 Hilde Sandhaland et al.
surrounding environment. According to the officer, ‘I have to do this when we are sailing
because I don’t have time to do it in port; on the other hand, when we are sailing, I am
supposed to navigate. If we get audits, theywon’t let us leave until it [the paperwork] is done.
Now I am two weeks behind and have to finish before we reach port.’ (V1-O4)
In the situation outlined above, no onewas paying attention to the technical system or the
fairway for a long period of time, which was not typical. However, other participants also
expressed concerns about the number of administrative tasks in relation to their ability to
perform navigational tasks:
When we are leaving port, we are far at sea before we have finished the paperwork. We are
supposed to finish beforewe leaveport, but that is not the case. Iwould havepreferred that he
[the second watch officer] was looking out of the windows instead of doing paperwork. (V3-
O1)
In the statement above, the informant is suggesting that the intended organizational
redundancy of manning the bridge with two persons is decreased because of
administrative requirements during a demanding phase of the voyage.
Electronic devices
Other disturbing elements, such as the use of private mobile phones and personal
computers, could also be characterized as distracting elements in this context. Major
differences were observed both among the vessels and between shifts on each
vessel, ranging from few or no observations on many of the shifts (V1-S1, V1-S2, V2-
S1, V2-S2, and V3-S1) to the extensive use of such devices by some shifts (V3-S2, V4-
S1, and V4-S2). The use of electronic devices on the bridge seems to be associated
with age: It mainly involved the youngest crew members. It also seems to be
associated with shipboard leadership, because minutes from HSE (Health, Safety and
Environment) meetings indicate that the use of such devices had previously been an
issue on board a vessel (V1) on which no such observations were made in this
study. The minutes stated that the use of personal electronic devices was prohibited
on the bridge.
Non-essential conversations
To maintain attention during periods of low workload, conversation might be necessary;
however, conversations could distract from the bridge team’s monitoring tasks. The
following passage describes the context of a conversation that took place on one of the
vessels:
The vessel is positioned for its loading/offloading operation in close proximity to the offshore
facility. The officer whose responsibility it is to operate the DP system is conversing about
personal issues with another crew member who is off duty. The upper part of the DP
operator’s body is turned towards the other crew member (sideways in relation to the DP
station), and he (presumably) switches his attention back and forth between the DP station,
the surroundings and his off-duty colleague. (V1-O2)
Does this conversation distract from theDPoperator’smonitoring tasks? According to one
of the vessel’s officers, it does not:
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At the same time, the researcher and another officer are conversing on a topic related to
technology and attention demands [on another part of the bridge]. During the conversation,
the officer says, ‘It takes a lot experience to converse like he is doing [points towards the DP
operator] and still be able to operate the DP.’ (V1-O1)
In the situation outlined above, the officer emphasizes the importance of experience for
the ability tomanagemultiple tasks. Similar situations were observed on the other vessels.
In general, access to the bridge does not seem to be restricted, thereby increasing the risk
of distractions and interruptions by other crew members.
Summary of findings
This study presents new empirical information about how shipboard practices regarding
planning, communication, and management of interrupting/distracting elements are
realized in real-world settings onboard four selected PSVs. Several practices highlighted in
our study were observed in all of the vessels: Contingency planning as an individual
activity, distractions/interruptions due to non-essential conversations, and limited use of
standardized communication during transfer of command. It is worth noting that the two
vessels that practised two-way communication when completing the checklists had
limited or no use of personal electronic devices on the bridge and practised standardized
communication during the transfer of the steering position belonged to the same shipping
company.
In the following sections, we will discuss the findings summarized in Table 1 in the
light of the theoretical concept of DSA.
Discussion
Planning practices
Prior to the decision of how to approach and position the vessel alongside the offshore
facility, information has to be collected from agents in the system, including anemom-
eters, wave riders, current and tide tables, and weather forecasts. This information is
Table 1. Summary of findings
Themes Observable practices
Planning Planning of approach as an individual activity: V1 (*), V2 (), V3 (*), V4 (*)
Contingency planning as an individual activity: V1 (+), V2 (+), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Communication Completion of checklists as an individual activity: V1 (), V2 (), V3 (*), V4 (*)
Limited use of standardized communication during transfer of command: V1 (+),
V2 (+), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Inadequate transfer of information during DP operations: V1 (*), V2 (), V3 (),
V4 (*)
Limited use of standardized communication during transfer of manoeuvring
position: V1 (*), V2 (), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Distractions and
interruptions
Administrative tasks: V1 (*), V2 (), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Electronic devices: V1 (*), V2 (), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Non-essential conversations: V1 (+), V2 (+), V3 (+), V4 (+)
Note. (+), could find; (*), found a tendency; (), could not find.
DP, dynamic positioning.
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crucial for the bridge team’s ability to choose the safest strategy. This study revealed
notable differences in planning practices, ranging from overt discussions to an implicit
agreement among the bridge team members. Because SA information is held by different
teammembers, they must share information to achieve an adequate understanding of the
situation. There are thus some compelling arguments in favour of planning as a team
activity. First, it is a reasonable assumption that planning as a team activity facilitates
exchange of information that is relevant to SA. Second, because each team member has a
different perspective on the world, they have to interact to help each other in making
sense of their perspectives including howwind,waves, and currents, in combinationwith
the vessel’s technical status, will affect the vessel. Through collaboration, they can
construct a more complete understanding of the situation than would be available to any
individual alone (Weick, 2005). In other words, planning as a team activity may bolster
safety by increasing the likelihood of relevant information being transferred and properly
assessed by the bridge team prior to the operation.
Whenever the vessel is positioned alongside the offshore facilities, there is limited time
to act if something unforeseen should occur. Technical faults, loss of signals to the
positioning reference systems, and sudden changes inweather conditions are examples of
unforeseen events that could lead to severe consequences without immediate mitigating
actions. It is therefore particularly important that the bridge team be cognizant of
potential threats anddisturbances likely to act on the systemandhave an idea of how to act
if the worst-case scenarios should materialize. In a DSA perspective, it is emphasized that
each agent’s SA should be compatible in a manner that binds collaborative systems
together (Stanton et al., 2010). Although the officer in command is responsible for the
safe approach and positioning of the vessel, the co-pilot should be able to provide support
whenever needed. Contingency planning as a team activity prior to the operation may
therefore facilitate a shared understanding of potential threats and disturbances. We
acknowledge, however, that shared SA is problematic because personal differences in
schemata, skills, and training influence how information is processed. Nonetheless, there
remains a need for shared information when the bridge team members have overlapping
responsibilities. A high degree of shared knowledge about potential threats and
disturbances may facilitate and promote coordinated actions in stressful situations, when
decisions must be made rapidly.
Communication practices
Checklists are important tools in the planning stage prior to entering an offshore facility’s
safety zone. From aDSA perspective, checklists are an important tool for ensuring that SA-
relevant information is transferred within the system. Although checklists do not contain
SA-relevant information, they can be used to ensure that SA-relevant information is
retrieved. The maritime industry often looks to the aviation industry for guidance
regarding the use of checklists. In the aviation industry, checklist are used when
configuring the plane. Two of the stated objectives that are generally highlighted are to
‘allowmutual supervision (cross checking) among crewmembers’ and to ‘enhance a team
(crew) concept (. . .) by keeping all crewmembers “in the loop”’ (Degani &Wiener, 1993,
p. 347). To meet these objectives, the manner in which the checklists are completed is
relevant. Surprisingly, significant variation in the use of checklists on board the vessels
was observed. Although practices on some of the vessels allowed for mutual supervision
and/or keeping both bridge teammembers informed, other vessels did not seem to utilize
this potential because the checklists were generally completed by a single officer or a
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cadet. In addition, checklists were sometimes conducted by the bridge team that was
going off shift rather than the bridge team thatwas responsible for safe navigation. In such
cases, the checklists did not ensure information exchange between external agents (e.g.,
technical equipment and the offshore facility) and the officers that depended on the
information to achieve SA for the task at hand. This practice may indicate a false sense of
security in that completing checklists becomes a task rather than a safeguard.
Previous research lends support to the idea that higher-performing teams transfer
information between team members to a greater extent than lower-performing teams
(Westli, Johnsen, Eid, Rasten, & Brattebo, 2010). It follows from a DSA perspective that
each team member’s SA should be compatible for the system as a whole to function well
(Stanton et al., 2006). Considering that the situation on board a PSV is dynamic and
involves extensive flow of information, accurate information exchange among bridge
teammembers is especially important. In particular, information exchange must support
each officer’s SA needs regarding their function in the team. An example highlighted in
this paper concerns observations that indicated that the co-officer acknowledged pre-
warnings in theDP systemwithout transferring thepotentially essential information to the
DP operator. In this case, the DP operator’s SA could have been affected by shortcomings
in information exchange.
Practices related to the transfer of command were also highlighted in our study, both
during shift handover and during shifts. For the officer in command to acquire the
information necessary for his/her SA, an exchange of information about the vessel’s
operational status must precede the transfer of command; however, our observations
indicate that command was occasionally transferred during a shift without such an
exchange. Although the information is available from tools at the bridge, such asmonitors
and control panels, verbal exchange is conducive to intuitive understanding. A practice
that allows technology to dominate exchanges of information may therefore delay the
duty officers’ achievement of SA. It is a reasonable assumption that consistent transfer of
operational information, both during and between shifts, will reduce the likelihood of
misunderstandings.
According to Smith-Jentsch et al. (1998), there is a distinction between information
exchange and communication: A critical dimension of communication ishow information
is exchanged. The use of standard communication phrases is one of the most important
factors in communication in safety-critical organizations. This practice enables quick and
effective communication while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of misunder-
standings (International Air Transport Association, 2011). Standard Maritime Communi-
cation Phrases (InternationalMaritimeOrganization, 2005) include, for instance, standard
communication phrases for the transfer of command on the bridge; however, the use of
standardized phrases to indicate the transfer of command, such as ‘You are now in
command’ or ‘I am now in command’, was not observed. This finding was surprising
because their use is proposed in the Standard Maritime Communication Phrases. The
usefulness of such phrases is further emphasized by the fact that confusion about the
transfer of command was a contributory factor in two cases of collisions between
attendant vessels and offshore facilities on the Norwegian continental shelf in the last
decade (Oltedal, 2012). Our observational findings suggest that the limited use of
standard maritime communication phrases and closed-loop communication during
transfer of command might increase the risk of misunderstandings regarding each team
member’s role and responsibilities.
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Interrupting and distracting elements
Interruptions and distractions pose a serious threat because of their impact on the
distribution of the team members’ attention. In previous studies in the maritime industry
(Grech, Horberry, & Smith, 2002) and other industries (e.g., Jones & Endsley, 1996;
Sneddon,Mearns& Flin, 2006), failure tomonitor or observewas themost common cause
of loss of SA. In otherwords, inadequate transfer of information between the operator and
other agents in the system preceded loss of SA. Our observations and statements from the
PSVs indicate that concurrent task management was frequent and that it occasionally
shifted attention away from the bridge team’s responsibilities to monitor other agents in
the system (e.g., monitors and the surrounding environment). Concurrent non-essential
tasks highlighted in this study include administrative tasks, use of electronic devices, and
non-essential conversations. These tasks were conducted while the bridge team had
important monitoring responsibilities related to both the technical equipment and the
surrounding environment. Whereas some of the informants described conflicting
requirements between administrative tasks and navigational responsibilities, we have
no data that could explain why they chose to let other disturbing elements interfere with
their navigational responsibilities. However, it is a reasonable assumption that if the DP
operator turns his/her back on technology for long periods, trust in technology might be
an influencing factor.
Regardless of whether disturbing/interrupting elements arise from the need to
complete administrative tasks, the use of electronic devices, or non-essential conversa-
tions, they require attention and cognitive resources. Although the officers frequently
directed attention towards their monitoring tasks, distractions might still have significant
implications for the bridge teams’ SA requirements. Even if attention is shifted in a timely
manner, additional cognitive effort is required to update SA (Loukopoulos et al., 2009).
This problem is recognized in the aviation industry, in which the ‘sterile cockpit’ rule was
implemented after a series of aviation accidents. The rule prohibits the crew from
performing non-essential duties and conducting non-essential conversations in specific
safety-critical situations (Sumwalt, 1993).Themaritime industryhas also acknowledged the
risk associatedwith interruptions and distractions. For instance, theNWEAguidelines state
that during the planning stages and approach to offshore facilities, all non-essential tasks
should be stopped or delegated (TheNorthWest European AreaGuidelines, 2009). From a
DSAperspective, this practicemakes sensebecause it is critical to eliminate factors that can
hamper timely and adequate transfer of SA-relevant information in day-to-day operations.
Conclusions
By consideration of the physical and social environment that surrounds the bridge team,
DSA models acknowledge that SA-related information is held both by human and by non-
human agents in the system, such as DP, Electronic Chart Display and Information
Systems,wind riders, and documents. SA is thus considered to be a systemproperty rather
than an individual property. Because both human and non-human agents comprise a
network, in which each agent holds SA-specific information, each agent’s SA is constantly
modified and updated through information exchange and interactions with other agents,
including the technological environment. In thismanner, a DSA approach better captures
the dynamic characteristic of complex collaborative systems than individual approaches
to SA. The bridge of a PSV represents a typical collaborative system in which bridge team
members interact with each other and with external agents in a high-tech environment.
To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined SA as a distributed phenomenon in
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the maritime industry. Our study is particularly relevant because the paper provides a
description of conditions thatmay influence the bridge teams’ SA in day-to-day operations,
and adds to our understanding of SA as a distributed phenomenon. By noting possible
areas for improvements regarding planning activities, communication practices, and
management of distracting/interrupting elements, the study provides an opportunity for
the maritime industry to establish shipboard practices that meet the bridge team’s
informationneeds in a complex environment. The studymight also provide awindow into
studying SA as a distributed phenomenon in other industrial settings; additionally,
because planning, communication, andmanagement of interrupting/distracting elements
are essential tasks in many collaborative systems, our findings may have implications for
other industrial settings as well.
Our findings may have practical implications for increasing DSA and reducing the risk
of adverse outcomes during bridge operations. First, we argue that planning as a team
activity may increase the likelihood that SA information will be shared and properly
assessed, because team members may possess different information. Second, communi-
cation emerges as a key factor in connecting and maintaining the parts of a distributed
system. It is therefore important that communication practices facilitate efficient and
reliable transfers of information between agents through increased use of closed-loop and
standardized communication. Finally, because achievement and maintenance of SA
require focused attention,management of interrupting/distracting elements is important.
Impaired attention may delay awareness of information provided by other agents, which
may in turn affect the bridge team’s SA needs.
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